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ABSTRACT
WWW.Privacy.gov: A Constitutional and 
Legislative Review
by
Stephanie Ann Murphy
Dr. Michael Bowers. Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Political Science 
University of Nevada. Las Vegas
One o f the most controversial and evolving rights recognized within recent years has 
been the right to privacy. During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court and the 
United States Congress recognized the existence o f this right, although in lim ited aspects. 
In the twenty-first century. Americans’ privacy rights have clashed with the evolution 
and the use of the Internet. Complications between a person’s privacy and the 
information needed for national security interests arose. The following study examines 
the question o f where the privacy o f an individual in this new era ends and where 
government intrusion begins. Through a qualitative analysis, constitutional and 
legislative aspects w ill be brought forth to challenge the idea that self-regulation is 
feasible within the growing cyber nation. Final analysis w ill bring forward new policy 
proposals to counter current problems in this virtual world.
Ill
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INTRODUCTION 
THE INTERNET
Since the II'* ’ o f September 2001, accusations o f government law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies spying on citizens as well as observations about legislators’ and the 
constituents’ lack o f involvement in current policy outcomes have become major issues 
to many users o f the Internet, who refer to themselves as “ Netizens.”  The right to privacy 
in this information era has become one o f the most controversial issues today. Yet in the 
wake o f the terrorist attacks on America, this unstable right has become more precarious 
than ever before. Questions o f where the government can intrude have been raised. 
However, w ith legislation such as the USA PATRIOT ACT and programs such as 
DCS 1000, one must ask whether there is a protected constitutional right to privacy, and if  
so. who or what w ill protect that right?
This thesis examines the problems that American Netizens face on the Internet in the 
aspect o f privacy. Chapter One addresses the history o f the Internet as well as the 
growing problems o f government encroachment on citizens’ privacy rights. Chapter Two 
discusses the Supreme Court’s rulings on whether or not government has the ability to 
impose electronic surveillance on the citizens’ constitutional right to privacy from 
government intrusion. The third chapter reveals Congress’s decisions on the growing 
privacy problems in respect to new technology. In addition, it w ill also address the USA 
PATRIOT ACT. The final chapter is a summary o f the preceding chapters and answers
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the question of whether or not the government believes that American Netizens have a 
right to privacy on the Internet. In addition, some proposals w ill be given to address the 
question o f who w ill protect the Netizens’ rights.
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CHAPTER I
WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE 
The Internet is a mysterious word that conjures up ideas o f digital or laser wires 
interlinking and overlapping one another, spanning across the ether of virtual space to 
link human interactions between numerous people. Fantasy images of this network, 
created by mad scientists, are epitomized in movies such as “ Tron,”  “ Hackers," and “ The 
Net" which create an environment that pits the good against the bad hackers.' The idea 
o f the Internet has become romanticized in today's world. Yet very few people who 
interact and use the Internet know what its capabilities are, and what the dangers are that 
hide beneath its surface. Most people, until recently, believed the Internet was a safe 
haven for many who wished to enter a new unknown world. However, with modem 
technology, this is all changing, and the users’ privacy becomes more o f an issue than 
ever before.
While the word Internet (National Information Infrastructure- N il)  seems innocent, 
there are many untold dangers that await those who have yet to travel the wrong cyber
' “ Hacker ” is a term that denotes a person who attempts to gain unauthorized access to a 
system, but does not seek to do any damage. It also refers to computer users who 
experiment with computer programs to test their limits. A  “ cracker ” is a term that has 
been proposed to refer to computer criminals, who unethically and illegally obtain access 
into systems. (Meyer and Baber 1997, 8-7)
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4road in this digital world." Every day, millions o f people around the world turn on their 
computers and log onto an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which w ill allow them to 
access the World Wide Web (web). People access their bank accounts, talk to or e-mail 
their friends and family, go shopping, plan trips, watch movies, listen to music, and read 
the news through the N il.  Some people access information on their representatives and 
pending legislation, sending electronic mail messages (e-mail) to state and federal 
representatives. In some states, one can even cast his or her ballot in elections instead o f 
taking the trip down to the polls. Nowadays people even work at home, submitting their 
work through e-mail to their companies, or they run small businesses using a web site. 
While the advantages o f the Internet are seen on a daily level, there still are many dangers 
or possible dangers that users face when interacting w ith others.
As one can see from the previous list o f Internet interactions, one of the chief dangers 
in this new society is that o f releasing too much information about one’s self allowing 
one’ s privacy to erode, even i f  indirectly. People argue that companies are becoming too 
inquisitive, asking too many personal questions, or g iving out too much information 
about individuals. Yet people are still w illing to submit their information to an unknown 
other, without asking questions. People seem to forget about him or herself as an 
individual and his or her protected rights. Moreover, there are still many who have 
forgotten that people are not the only factor involved in today’ s world, computers also 
play a huge role as well as the government and its interactions. Perhaps, by taking a look 
at the government and its relationship to the Internet, as well as how the Internet has
■ Some analysts o f the Internet refer to the Internet as the National Information 
Infrastructure (N il), and the proposed Information Superhighway as the Global
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evolved, one can see the attempts made to erode the individual’ s newfound privacy
right.-
The Birth o f a New W orld
The history o f privacy on the Internet is a rather short one when compared to 
traditional rights such as the right to protect one’ s property or the freedom to practice 
one’s religion. In 1969, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was contracted 
to connect four university computer labs; UCLA. Stanford, UCSB. and the University of 
Utah. The experiment was to provide a “ communications network that would work even 
i f  some o f the sites were destroyed by nuclear attack. I f  the most direct route was not 
available, routers would direct traffic around the network via alternative routes.’’ (Howe 
1998, 3) The network was also to facilitate cooperation between several research sites 
and eventually the m ilitary, as well as ensure the physical security o f the data and 
information available on the system. (Barrett 1996, 21) The experiment proved a 
success; so between the end o f December 1969 and by June o f 1970, four additional 
institutions decided to become a part o f the network. (Howe 1998, 3)
The 1970s brought additional institutions online. The ARPA-established network had 
been dubbed ARPANET, and NASA, a m ilitary space program, had joined the ranks o f 
institutions involved in this growing computer infrastructure. (Barrett 1996. 22; Howe 
1998. 3) A t this time, commercial interests in ARPANET did not exist. ARPANET was
Information Infrastructure (G Il). 1 shall be using these terms interchangeably throughout 
the text.
■ Chapter Two discusses the birth and history o f this right.
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6dedicated to pure research and information, and monitored through the government 
agency ARPA. By the mid 1970s the basic foundations for the Internet had been 
established, but due to the complex computer languages involved, it was very d ifficu lt to 
access. In 1979, Usenet, a private institution, created a newsgroup system that was based 
upon a 1978 Unix to Unix Copy Protocol. Essentially, the newsgroup system allowed 
different users from different sites to access topic specific discussion groups. The 
significant aspect was that it established early community building on a network, even 
though at the time it was still not a part o f the Internet due to differing programming 
architecture. These network communities would create the base foundations for the 
community o f Internet users who would call themselves Netizens. (Howe 1998, 3)
By 1980. the network had grown unbelievably large, and so a portion called M ILNET 
broke o ff*  The United States Defense Department adopted this communication network, 
but stipulated that there needed to be a way to connect both military and research 
networks in the future. The Defense Research Projects Agency (DARP.A) undertook the 
task o f connecting both networks to create DARPA Internet or DARPANET.
DARPANET would eventually be referred to as the Internet. (Barrett 1996, 22)
At the same time DARPA was linking research and military networks, private 
corporations began to start their own networks. One o f the first created was termed 
BITNET, referring to “ Because its [sic] Time Network.”  (Howe 1998,4) B ITN ET was 
connected to the IB M  mainframes in the educational community around the world to 
provide mail services, as well as discussion groups similar to those designed by Usenet.
M ILNET is the m ilitary communications network.
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7In 1983, the DARPA Internet was universally accepted and adopted on a national 
level. By then, commands became easier for the normal person to access and learn. This 
opened up the Internet to multi-department usage in universities. Prior to 1983. 
departments in computer science and physics were some o f the few departments that had 
the technological know-how to access the information. By the mid-1980s gateways had 
been developed to connect B ITN ET with the Internet. This provided not only the 
exchange o f e-mail, but also linked the discussion groups so educational facilities could 
communicate in real time as well. (Howe 1998. 3-4) Unfortunately, w ith the increase in 
university additions the Internet sites started to become unmanageable.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the National Science Foundation (NSF) assuming 
DARPA’s governing role. W ith the responsibility o f governing the Internet also came an 
additional duty to create a gateway for the United Kingdom’s Joint Academic Network 
(JANET)^ to the Internet. A t this time, the first attempts were made to index the 
Internet.^ In addition, one o f the prime groundbreaking inventions on the Internet was 
created. T im  Bemers-Lee at the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) made 
the Internet easier to use by creating hypertext. (Howe 1998, 5) Hypertext allows a user 
to access another remote site by clicking on a specific underlined or highlighted topic- 
linked word. (Meyer and Baber 1997, 5-7) This invention would eventually link various 
chat sites as well as additional informational sites to a specific topic discussed on one
 ^Similar to ARPANET, this educational network linked the U K ’ s finest universities.
 ^The first archiver o f the Internet was Peter Deutsch from M cG ill University in 
Montreal. He created a program that would read the FTP (file  transfer protocol) sites, 
and named this program Archie. Eventually other archivers, such as Jughead and 
Veronica would be created after Archie was terminated. (Howe 1998, 4-5)
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8web page, thus allowing users to easily and quickly access interest-related materials and 
discussions.
In July 1992, the first national commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP), Delphi, 
was permitted to open its electronic mail system to the public. Four months later all 
government imposed commercial limitations on Internet use had disappeared, making the 
Internet available to a variety o f commercial interests. (Howe 1998, 5-6; Barrett 1996,
23)
The year 1995 saw the end o f government control o f  American institutions on the 
Internet as the NSF released its sponsorship o f the N il to the privatized ISPs, such as the 
newly created America Online (AGL), Prodigy, and CompuServe. This private control 
allowed for individuals not in  the academic community to access the Internet through 
personal computers (PCs) and dial-up modems. The ISP provided a service that allowed 
home PCs access to the provider’ s supercomputers, the hosts, which would then allow the 
user access to the Internet through wide area networks. This created facilities that would 
be available to anyone who wished to take part in the Internet experience. (Barrett 1996, 
23) In addition, the government’s lack o f involvement facilitated the new Netizens’ 
feelings o f independence and unprecedented freedom.
The final and most crucial step in introducing the Internet to future Netizens was in 
the 1998 release o f W indows 98. Incorporated w ith in the system was a new Microsoft 
friendly browser. This allowed thousands o f people easy access to the Internet, where 
they in turn found information on a variety o f topics as well as a way to meet other users 
to whom they could relate. (Howe 1998, 5-6) As a result, Internet communities began to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9grow, and with them came political awareness in establishing and defending the net 
communities’ personal rights.
Through the Internet’s history, one can see the growth o f a new world. A t one time, 
government had taken an active role in the Internet. However, realizing that the Internet 
had social and market potential in addition to the research and information aspect, the 
government allowed private corporations to take over and make the rules. Eventually, 
the government would find that minimal intervention in the Internet was more lucrative 
to the United States’ market economy. However, the lack o f intervention also facilitated 
the rise in computer crimes. As a result, after several years o f minimal government 
intervention and the allowance o f private regulation through the ISPs, the U.S. 
government decided, as it did with other new technology throughout the 20'*’ century, to 
use the Internet as a tool to capture criminals and deviants. The idea was to eliminate the 
then current private industry regulations created from the ISPs, since these case by case 
created regulations failed to hinder the increasing rise in electronic crime performed by 
crackers, regular enterprising criminals, and identity thieves. ("N o Place to Hide," 2001)
In addition, law enforcement agencies grew aware o f the increasing use o f electronic 
bombs, often referred to as e-bombs,’ viral worms, and the discussions o f an e-jihad.
' E-bombs can affect a system in a variety o f ways. They are usually a computer virus 
attached to a file, which is sent through e-mail. The first experiences with e-bombs and 
viruses were seen around 1982. Since then they have evolved from immature 
programming glitches to intricate codes (macros) that have little  programs within that 
reformat a computer’s operating system and programs. (Buderi 1999, 34-36)
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A Backdoor In
Since September 11, 2001 the government has come down even harder on Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs). Consequently, online privacy has taken a huge blow as 
legislators and law enforcement agencies weigh national security against the populace’s 
privacy. The debate ranges from the continuance o f ISP self-regulation to judicial and 
congressional sanctioned allowances o f government intervention techniques. How ever, 
one o f the most disturbing and disappointing aspects to result from the security debate 
after September 1 f ' '  comes from the American citizens themselves. In a Newsweek poll 
taken during September 13“' and 14“’ o f 2001, "57 percent o f Americans said that they 
would support eroding encryption protection to help law enforcement monitor terrorism 
suspects- even i f  it might affect privacy and business practices. Thirty-nine percent were 
opposed, the rest undecided.’’ (Associated Press 2001, 2) This drop in concern for privacy 
would appear to suppon federal agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and the Federal Bureau o f Investigation (FBI), in initiating a variety o f snoop programs. 
Perhaps in this new era o f American vulnerability previous debates on encryption,
DCS 1000, keystroke logging, and anonymous proxies w ill fall to the side as a result of 
fears initiated through recent acts o f violence, and the government w ill be able to 
intervene without restraints.*
One o f the areas in which government wishes to take a stand is in the realm o f 
cryptography, or encryption. Encryption, a highly debated issue, is considered one o f the 
ultimate defenses against all those who are not supposed to access the information one 
person sends to another. In order to use encryption, one person must have the "key ” to
* These terms w ill be discussed further in this chapter.
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II
encrypt a message, and the other person must have a matching “ decoder key" in order to 
read that message. Those who send sensitive or confidential information in 
communications and transactions, such as a credit card number or physical address, 
usually support encryption. In addition, encryption can be seen as a means o f personal 
identification, like a signature, thus verifying that information sent from one pany to 
another is legitimate. (Bennett and Grant 1999. 120) While terrorists and criminals can 
potentially use encryption, the current debate is whether or not encry ption is less likely to 
be used by them since it would probably attract more attention to their communications, 
which is something they do not desire.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government is seeking access to American created encryption 
software, in hopes that by attaining an all access key, it can prevent crim inal events. 
Unfortunately, the problem may not be so easily fixed because not all encryption 
software is created or made in the United States and the U.S. government cannot force 
foreign companies to abide by their demands for an all access key. Furthermore, even i f  
the American companies provided the government w ith all access keys, why would a 
crim inal knowingly use encryption software that law enforcement agencies had the 
ability to read? The more like ly  possibility is that American criminals would buy foreign 
encryption, even i f  it could be obtained only through the black market. These arguments 
are similar to the ones seen in the debate for and against anonymous proxies/posters and 
remailers. (Associated Press 2001, 2)
Anonymous proxies, posters, and remailers are services that allow people to access 
the Internet to engage in anonymous bulletin board postings and e-mail. There have been 
huge debates on the anonym ity o f remailers in the past few years. O rigina lly they were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
intended for psychological patients who were recovering from some traumatic experience 
or political dissidents who feared government retribution. But in recent years, hackers 
and crackers have adopted them as their sanctuary. In fact, many o f the computer e-mail 
viruses released have originated from these remailers. (Buderi 1999, 36) W hile some 
remailers comply with governments' requests to release information on a user, most 
support the users' anonymity and consequently have been shut down through court 
injunctions and ISP sanctions for taking a stand to protect the anonymity and privacy of 
their members. (Anschiitz 2001,42-44; Levine 1996. 1526-1572)
One o f the big winners resulting from the current fear climate w ill be Carnivore, 
recently renamed DCSIOOO.*  ^ Part o f a covert FBI surveillance triad known as the 
"Dragon Ware Suite.” "' Carnivore is reportedly a stealthy looking black box outfitted 
with a Pentium 111 containing Windows NT. which is equipped with "packet sniffing 
software.”  (Cohen 2001. 50; Meeks 2001. 1). Essentially, when the FBI has identified a 
suspect w hose e-mail they wish to peruse, they acquire a court order sim ilar to a phone 
wiretap and take Carnivore out o f storage from Quantico, Virginia. Then working in 
conjunction with the ISPs, who are under court order to comply and keep quiet about it, 
the program is installed into the network for the FBI. Once installed. Carnivore searches 
through e-mail tra ffic for a name, looking at "To”  and "From”  lines, IP addressees, and
' The renaming o f Carnivore has to do with the negative implications o f the name. While 
the program was named for "getting to the meat”  o f the information, the sinister name 
caused many complaints among online users. As a result, this FBI program was renamed 
to take away the creepy connotation. (Cohen 2001, 50)
"Dragon Ware Suite is more than simply an e-mail snooping program: i t ’s capable o f 
reconstructing the web surfing trail of someone under investigation... [It can) reconstruct 
web pages exactly as a surveillance target saw them while surfing the Web...Besides 
Carnivore, the Dragon Ware Suite includes programs called Packeteer’ and
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keywords in the header or the body o f the e-mail. According to the FBI. the software is 
“ designed to spy with ‘surgical’ precision on specific individuals.”  (Cohen 2001. 50) (See 
APPENDIX I I I  to find more information on Carnivore.)
For obvious reasons, critics" o f Carnivore debate the merits o f this program, stating 
that it endangers our society and our freedoms in allowing for the possibility o f the 
Internet morphing into a massive surveillance system. Yet. the other side o f the argument 
is that it allows law enforcement agencies to crack down on drug trafficking and other 
illegal activities. The pros and cons o f the debate are strong on both sides; yet what 
critics usually forget is that the information the FBI can acquire tru ly depends on the kind 
of court order that the agency obtains. Court orders usually issued allow for the FBI to 
acquire e-mail addresses in a form that resemble those of a "pen-register”  or a "tap-and- 
trace.”  which allow law enforcement agencies to get phone numbers o ff a telephone 
line.'" However, in order for the FBI to gain the fu ll substance o f the e-mail, a full-blown 
content wiretap is required, which the courts are far less w illing  to provide. (Cohen 2001, 
50)
Moreover, critics worry about the possibility o f the FBI misusing its "tap-and traces” 
as well as "pen-registers.”  The government contends that these lim ited wiretaps entitle 
them only to the e-mail headers, yet some critics state that to obtain access to even the 
header, the FBI should have to meet the same high standards required for a content
‘Coolminer.’ ... These data programs are used to reconstruct the raw data scooped up in 
the initial phase by Carnivore.”  (Meeks 2001, 2)
"  The Following are some of the critics o f the Carnivore program; c iv il libertarians;
John Perry Barlow, co founder o f the Electric Freedom Foundation; and Lee Tien, senior 
staff attorney w ith  the Electronic Freedom Foundation.
'" A  "tap-and-trace”  allows police to record the phone numbers a suspect dials. "Pen- 
registers”  let the police log the phone numbers o f incoming calls. (Cohen 2001, 50)
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wiretap.'-’ In addition, reviewers o f the program debate whether or not Carnivore is as
surgical as the FBI contends. The fear involves the likelihood o f the FBI downloading 
information about non-targets that it may happen to intercept. The unspoken fear is that 
eventually the C IA  and the FBI would be able to easily build a dossier on just about 
everyone. As a result, analysts would like to see legislation that requires the FBI to throw 
out collected evidence that is not involved in the investigation. Another possibility is that 
once the investigation is over, rather than storing the acquired information in a permanent 
database, purging that information would be obligatory. (Cohen 2001, 50)
However, with the current political climate seen in the United States and the media, 
advocates for privacy on the Internet are finding that they are fighting an uphill battle. In 
fact, the national mood may increase funding for other surveillance programs, such as the 
National Security Agency's (NSA) Echelon program, which is a global wire-tapping 
network. This system grew out o f the 1945 jo in t agreement to share information obtained 
with the intelligence operations o f New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Very 
little is known about Echelon, but in a report given by the European Parliament in July 
2001. not only was its existence confirmed, but also its ab ility  to intercept any telephone 
conversation. Internet connection, e-mail, or worldwide fax. (Cohen 2001, 52) Like 
Carnivore, it can hone in on specific words, such as "h ijack", "bomb” , or "jihad”  to name 
a few. However, it is debatable as to how effective Echelon actually is, since the system 
collects up to 3 m illion messages a minute, which then must be sorted through. Critics
Headers are the headlines in the message box that summarize the contents o f a 
message.
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such as Adam Cohen contend that I f  this system were actually effective. September 1 
would not have happened.
Echelon poses a real privacy problem in that it is a global system that intrudes 
without the required jud ic ia l oversight that even Carnivore must have. Moreover.
Internet traffic travels in such a way that a majority o f the world's e-mail and other 
communiqués cross over the United States' borders and then out once again. Not only is 
there concern about Echelon spying on foreign communications, but also those 
communications between Americans abroad and residents, who are supposed to be 
outside NSA jurisdiction. (Cohen 2001. 52)
Even w ithout the use o f DCS 1000. encryption access, anonymous proxies' help, or 
Echelon, the increase o f computer forensics in the law enforcement and intelligence 
fields w ill probably rise. One o f the most interesting tools currently being used is that o f 
keystroke logging. Keystroke logging essentially uses a suspect's computer keyboard 
against that person. Investigators secretly install hardware in the perpetrator's computer. 
The device then records each and every letter a person types into his or her computer, 
turning the computer into a mole for the a g e n c y .O b v io u s ly  this allows officials to view 
correspondence, at least from one end, as well as the prized passwords needed to unlock 
encrypted messages. (Dam and Lin 1996, 49) Furthermore, i f  one expands this 
unsanctioned activity, privacy, anonymity, freedom o f  speech, and the security o f each
"  Encryption and keystroke logging are often used in Information Warfare (IW ). Other 
avenues used in IW  include: physical destruction o f facilities, degradation o f the 
opponent's system through covertly using software and/or hardware, withdrawal o f 
opponent’ s data, replacing it with misleading data, and using software as a mole against 
the opponent. (Dam and Lin 1996,49
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American are violated ever)' time this technology is used for any reason, including the 
capturing and prosecuting o f criminals.
In light o f these government intrusions, questions revolving around a citizen’s 
personal privacy arise. In Chapter Two. privacy is defined and outlined. In addition, 
government intrusion into a citizen's life, and how far that intrusion may go is also 
e.xamined.
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CHAPTER II
PRIVACY A LL GROWN UP
Privacy in the United States has become one o f the most highly debated rights today. 
While there are many who claim  that the right to privacy is a fanciful privilege, the 
proponents o f that interest hold to the idea that it. like many other rights, is inalienable. 
Opponents o f privacy rights, however, have a true advantage, in that the basis for this 
claim is said to be unstable. The major reason stems from the fact that, while the United 
States Supreme Court and the supporters o f privacy rights derive this liberty out o f the 
Constitution, there is no direct language in the document establishing the existence of 
privacy.
For many people, privacy is a d ifficu lt concept to define. Legal scholars have long 
debated what privacy should entail or whether it even exists in our society. As 
technology improves every year, the bairiers that formerly defined private life from 
public become more blurred. In addition, not only do technological enhancements create 
problems in defining privacy, legislation, such as the Freedom o f Information Act, also 
causes further difficulties. The average person would find defining privacy to an exact 
meaning perplexing, i f  not impossible. Yet most Americans would probably understand 
privacy as some form o f secrecy kept to one’s self. O f course, privacy entails a realm o f 
human conduct that is “ no one's business," except for those players involved who hold an 
immediate interest. Unfortunately, this definition can encompass a variety o f issues both
17
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in the public and private realms.*^ In a world becoming smaller each day. the exact
meaning o f privacy should be something both a layperson and a scholar can agree on. 
especially in understanding legislation; otherwise there arises the risk o f conceptual 
confusion between society and the elite.
Judith Wagner Decew's book. In Pursuit o f Privacv. discusses the many definitions of 
privacy. Essentially, privacy is a reference to “ the separation o f spheres o f activity, limits 
on governmental authority, forbidden knowledge and experience, lim ited access, and 
ideas o f group membership, to name a few possibilities." (Decew 1997. 13) As one can 
see. privacy encompasses a broad number o f areas: thus finding a precise defin ition for 
privacy becomes a challenge. One possibility given is that it is the ability to make 
independent and self-legislating choices. (Decew 1997. 40) While this tends to be the 
major underlying idea in most constitutional cases, which usually hold some interest in 
making fundamentally independent, personal decisions, the real question is whether 
privacy entails more than just autonomy. The simple answer, according to the courts, is 
"yes." especially in regards to electronic surveillance, which has ver\ little  to do with 
autonomous decision making, and more to do with informal documented knowledge.'^ 
Privacy itself is a multifaceted concept where competing claims and values clash. 
However, this discussion w ill be limited to personal information acquired illegally or 
unethically through technological advances.
In respect to the law. the public realm can sometimes include damages against private 
individuals, which would then fall under tort case law. Thus, the public realm would 
consist o f whether or not the government has constitutional claims against an individual.
In reference to informal documented knowledge, we shall also include private 
electronic mail, as well as information about Internet surfing.
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Privacy’s Evolution
Historically, it has been argued that the concept o f privacy existed before the 
founding o f the New World, dating as far back as the ancient Greeks. (Decew 1997. 9-25) 
Examples o f the notion o f privacy can be taken from  philosophers such as Aristotle. The 
polis, as Aristotle discussed, was a structured politica l sphere where government and the 
city-state prevailed. By nature, man was a politica l creature and thus suited to participate 
in the political realm. Yet for Aristotle, in order for each man to hold an enviable status 
in the polis, he must first be master o f his own private sphere, or oikos. The oikos 
involved the private household, or home, and the fam ily life. This included concepts 
such as reproduction, birth, death, and other activities, which were either religious or 
what was “ deemed individual,”  areas that were not available for public governance. 
(Decew 1997, 10; Swanson 1992 2-4) As one can see, the concept o f oikos versus the 
polis  is just the beginning o f a long debate regarding communal interests against that of 
the individual.
In the United States, scholars contend that the Founding Fathers had intended for 
citizens to have some form o f privacy when they wrote the T h ird a n d  Fourth’** 
Amendments to the Constitution. (Scott 1995, 32-33) Furthermore, the additions o f the 
F ir s t ,F if th , '” and Ninth Amendments,*' “ demonstrated an awareness that governments
“ No soldier shall, in time o f peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of 
the Owner, nor in time o f war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”
”* “ The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
“ Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom o f speech, or of the press; or the right of
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could threaten the privacy and integrity o f  each person and o f his or her religious 
practice, speech, association, home, and personal possessions.”  (Strum 1998, 197) The 
origins o f these amendments derived from the idea that each man was free and the master 
o f his own castle. Thus, for a government to intrude upon that man’s home or his liberty 
meant that the government was intruding into that man’s personal privacy realm.
A t the birth o f this country, the colonials, who had lived in oppression under British 
rule and had suffered from the exploitation delivered through the hands o f the British 
soldiers, sought to make their new government less intrusive and controlling. (Scott 1995. 
42-43) Consequently, the tone o f the Constitution, coupled with the new idea o f 
federalism, began to shape this new nation. However, it was the combination o f the 
Constitution and its amendments as well as the topography of the country that created an 
early decentralized government and a less communally oriented society, which sought 
and revered individuality. Arguably, the amendments to the Constitution can be called 
the chrysalis o f the privacy arguments that we hold today.
The 1850s brought forth the beginning o f actual documentation and awareness in the 
realm o f emerging privacy rights. (Scott 1995, 37; Warren and Brandeis 1890, 207-210)
It was a time when rugged individualism clashed with traditional society’ s knowledge of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress o f 
grievances.”
“ No person shall be held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
presentment or indictment o f a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the M ilitia , when in actual service in time o f War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to  be twice put in jeopardy o f life  or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived o f 
life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. ”
■' “ The enumeration in the Constitution, o f certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people.”
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its neighbors." Advancements in technology sparked an increase in the output o f the 
media. Prior to the C iv il War. there were few newspapers, primarily due to the expense 
o f producing them. However, w ith  the development in new technologies, such as the 
improvements in printing, photography and telegraphy, and the growing mass market of 
new. ill-educated readers (immigrants), newspapers felt the need to meet the market’s 
demands. Between 1850 and 1890. the production o f newspapers in the larger cities shot 
up from around 100 newspapers circulating to 800.000 readers a day. to approximately 
900 urban papers with over 8 m illion  readers. (Scott 1995. 38)
The outcomes o f this new market were remarkable. Just about anyone w ho wished to 
know about newsworthy information could easily access it i f  he could read or have the 
paper read to him. No longer did a person have to hear a garbled story by word o f mouth; 
he could access the story through an assumed reliable source. Moreover, this new form 
o f journalism, which resulted from the increase in papers, also provided entertainment for 
the reader, presenting the news in a vivid and titillating way. This form soon came to be 
known as yellow journalism.'^
As with all advancements in technology, the downside o f these advancements 
allowed for the media to present pictures o f private citizens and public figures easier than
"  Looking over the history o f humankind, traditional society stems from the idea that 
humans, at one time, lived together for the benefits o f communal liv ing that included 
security, a sense o f belonging and an interdependency that included division o f labor 
among the different members. In this society, being a member o f the group overrode any 
sense o f the independent self, thus privacy was not an issue. One did not have secrets 
from a neighbor. Even what would be considered private fam ily information today, such 
as child rearing, was within the traditional community’s knowledge and interests. ( Scott 
1995; DeCew 1997)
'■ The term yellow journalism orig inally resulted from the newspapers’ yellowish tint, 
but later became known for the type o f publication that focused on the upper echelon o f
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before. Soon blaring headlines and accompanying pictures sparked the 
acknowledgement that there was a threat to privacy. For example, in the 1890 New York 
case Marion Manola v. Stevens &  Mvers. “ a starlet who was appearing wearing tights in 
a Broadway play became angry when two photographers secretly photographed her 
during her performance, one with a flash. Afraid they would take her photo to the 
newspapers, she sued to prevent them, and the New York Supreme Court agreeably 
complied, by issuing an injunction.”  (Scott 1995. 39) It was cases sim ilar to this one. as 
well as the increasing aggressiveness and impropriety o f the media, that led to a ground 
breaking article on privacy written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in the 
December 15. 1890 Harvard Law Review.
In their article. “ The Right to Privacy.”  Warren and Brandeis discussed how. at the 
time, there was no clear conception o f privacy in American law. even though there had 
been occasional references to the idea that people had the “ right to be let alone.”  (Warren 
and Brandeis 1890, 193) They drew the examples for their arguments from cases in 
Britain and Ireland, as well as from philosophical arguments they conceived. They 
argued that the legal system needed privacy torts so that people could seek justice and 
compensation when their personal privacy was invaded. The v illa in  throughout their 
argument was the irresponsible press that had run wild. It was their view that people 
living in this modem and complex life  needed a “ retreat from the world”  through privacy 
and solitude. (Warren and Brandeis 1890. 196) But as a result o f the invasiveness o f the 
press, they doubted this ability to achieve peace o f the soul or the private self. In the end. 
they believed that the individual should have the ability to determine his or her own mind
individuals as well as the criminals o f the day. It was an eclectic m ix o f “ sin, sex and
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and to what degree he or she would communicate those thoughts to others. W hile most 
people o f the time accepted this concept under a common law notion, Warren and 
Brandeis solidified this principle in their argument, which would play an important role 
in future Supreme Court cases.
The end o f the nineteenth century and the beginning o f the twentieth century brought 
additional confrontations between the press and private citizens. Yet what few people 
seemed to notice was the increasing intrusiveness o f the United States government, 
especially in terms o f electronic surveillance. By the 1920s, government surveillance 
became the new front in the battle against an individual's privacy. Eventually, this would 
become a fight over the privacy rights implied in the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment states: “ The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
However, the government argued that as long as the surveillance did not invade or 
intrude into a suspect’ s home, it had followed the letter o f the law. While the Supreme 
Court did not always agree w ith  the government on the issue o f intrusiveness, it would 
not be until the 1960s that the Court would reprimand the government for violating an 
individual’s space."'*
The 1960s brought forth a plethora o f privacy dilemmas, ranging across an 
individual’s autonomy in decisions regarding her own reproductive system, government
violence”  and fit today’s view o f the news. (Scott 1995, 38) 
■■* See Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505 [I960].
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warrantless wiretapping, an individual’s refusal to cut his hair, the rights o f high school 
students, and the right to observe or read obscenity in the privacy o f one’ s own home. 
(Gottfried 1994, 104-105) Some o f these issues, as discussed previously, had more to 
do with an individual’s autonomy and that o f the state’s interest. However, a growing 
number had to do with emerging new technologies, which allowed for more government 
intervention. In addition. American society was characterized by an increase in 
antiestablishment political thinking which was reflected in the mid-1960s 
counterculture. Furthermore, the explosion in surveillance technology not only came 
from the government, but also from the private corporate sector. (Scott 1995, 53)
As society began to feel the emergence of privacy rights, traditional monitors, such as 
the family, the education system, and religion started to erode. The social constraints and 
relationships that once dictated the morals and feelings o f accountability to others no 
longer mattered as much and the notion o f the individual began to root itself w ithin the 
culture. As a result, the government began to grow, taking the place o f the traditional 
behavior controlling mechanisms, and becoming the dominating factor in deciding upon 
acceptable behavior in society. For example, the government began to address issues 
involving discrimination and the right to work, reproduction, abortion, copulation 
between two consenting adults, and child labor to name a few. (Blank and Merrick 1995) 
In addition, once people began to isolate themselves as individuals from the group, 
curiosity about information on those people that at one time might have been easy to 
come by, rose. The outcome was an increase in the public ’ s demand for information on 
other people and in the behaviors o f those people, which, as discussed, were no longer 
being monitored by traditional elements in society. Unfortunately this demand for
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knowledge on another's life  has been one o f the contributing factors that have led to the 
problems that people are facing today, such as the fascination with public figures' private 
lives and problems. (Scott 1995, 54)
America’s Constitutional Privacy 
One o f the best methods for defining privacy and its history in America is seen in 
numerous Supreme Court opinions throughout the years. The very first Court opinion on 
personal privacy against governmental intrusion can be seen in the 1889 case o f Boyd v. 
United States. This landmark case in privacy protection involved the importation o f plate 
glass and the lack o f duty payment by E. A. Boyd &  Sons to customs as dictated by the 
then current customs act. The district attorney, acting under the authorization o f the 
customs act, obtained a court order for the invoices pertaining to the Boyds’ plate glass.
In response, the Boyds argued that the compulsory production o f their files violated their 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in respect to the prohibition o f unreasonable search 
and seizures as well as their right to protect themselves from self-incrimination.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Boyds’ argument with two justices 
dissenting on the grounds o f the Court’s Fourth Amendment argument. Justice Joseph 
Bradley for the Court opined that:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence o f constitutional 
liberty and security. They reach further than the concrete form o f the case...they 
apply to all invasions on the part o f the government and its employes [sic] o f the 
sanctity o f a man’s home and the privacies [sic] o f life. It is not the breaking o f his 
doors, and the rummaging o f his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the 
offense: but it is the invasion o f his indefeasible right o f personal security, personal 
liberty, [sic] and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his 
conviction o f some public offense,- it is an invasion o f this sacred right which
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underlines and constitutes the essence o f [the] judgment. (Boyd and others. 
Claimants, etc. v. United States 116 U.S. 532 [1886])
Yet it was not until the 1928 case o f Olmstead v. United States that the Court had a
chance to readdress the argument for personal privacy against government intrusion.
During this era, the United States had passed the National Prohibition Act. and Olmstead
was convicted o f the transporting and selling o f alcohol. He appealed to the Court on the
grounds that the evidence was illegally obtained through a wiretap. The Coun found that
privacy had not been invaded under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as Olmstead had
contended, since there was no physical invasion o f his house. Furthermore. Chief Justice
W illiam  Taft held that conversations between two private individuals were not protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, for the moment, the Court upheld the government
wiretap. However, in one o f the most famous opinions on privacy ever written. Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis' dissent stated;
The protection guaranteed...is much broader in scope. The makers o f our 
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit o f happiness. 
They recognized the significance o f a man’ s spiritual nature, o f his feelings and o f his 
intellect...They conferred as against the government, the right to be let alone- the 
most comprehensive o f rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by government upon the privacy o f an 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed as a violation o f the 
Fourth Amendment. (Olmstead v. United States 493 U.S. 572 [1928])
Despite Brandeis’ comment, the Court would continue to side with the government until
the passage o f the 1934 Federal Communications Act, which prohibited the interception
or retransmission o f any communication intercepted via wire or radio. (U.S. Public Law
416, Sec. 605)
Shortly after the passage o f the 1934 Federal Communications Act, the case o f 
Nardone et al. v. United States began to change the definition o f privacy and the areas o f
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its protection. Frank Carmine Nardone and others, like Olmstead, were also convicted of 
smuggling alcohol. Their dealings had been obtained through a wiretap via federal 
officers. Nardone contended that the evidence procured by the federal officers' wiretap 
was inadmissible due to the 1934 law. Justice Owen J. Roberts, w riting for the Court 
stated: “ Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should go 
unwhipped o f justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with 
ethical standards and destructive o f personal liberty...wiretapping by officers...involves 
a grave wrong."(Nardone et al v. United States 302 U.S. 277 [1937]) As a result, this 
case became one o f many that would weaken the Olmstead decision and strengthen 
arguments on personal privacy against government intrusion. However, the courts would 
continue to hold, until 1967. that in wiretapping cases, the Fourth Amendment could be 
applied only when there was physical entry and seizure o f tangible items. Overheard 
conversations, at this point, were still unprotected.
By the 1960s. the adopted argument on privacy was that the right was a derivative o f 
some o f the other constitutional rights, as pointed out in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 
U.S. 479 at 486 (1965). It was argued that these rights not only included property rights, 
but also rights to “ bodily security,”  which have very little to do w ith  the people who are 
not the main actors in a specific situation. (Decew 1997,46) As Justice W illiam  O. 
Douglas said in this case on contraceptives, “  [w]e deal with a right o f privacy older than 
the B ill o f Rights- older than our political parties, older than our school system. .It is an 
association that promotes a way o f life, not causes; a harmony in liv ing, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”  (Griswold v. Connecticut.
381 U.S. 479 [1965]) Government must be lim ited in some realms, Douglas wrote, as the
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Supreme Court struck down the Connecticut law forbidding the counseling or use o f 
contraceptives by anyone in the s ta te .W h ile  this may have little  to do with electronic 
surveillance, this decision is important because it not only broadened the realm o f privacy 
but also strengthened the base for this right. In this case, the holding rested upon the due 
process clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as in the “ penumbra" o f privacy 
interests protected in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
The case that arguably overturned what little was le ft o f Olmstead was Katz v. United 
Statesi 1967). Katz was convicted under an indictment that charged him with transmitting 
wagering information through the telephone across state lines. This was a violation o f 18 
U. S. C. 1084. Government agents had attached an electronic listening and recording 
device to the outside o f his most frequented telephone booth and had proceeded to 
document his unlawful transgressions. The Court held, as stated by Justice Potter 
Stewart, that the Fourth Amendment is not to be translated as a general “ right to privacy." 
The Amendment “ ...protects individual privacy against certain kinds o f governmental 
intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy...[it is 
meant to) protect people, not places.”  (Katz v United States 389 U.S. 350-351 [1967])
Moreover, he wrote that i f  a person knowingly exposes information to the public, 
then it is not covered by the Fourth Amendment. “ But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected...[W]hat he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding
However, the legitimate concern o f others can vary according to the circumstance 
involved and the culture. For example, in the United States, a couple’s decision about 
whether or not they use contraceptives is beyond the concern o f others, yet in countries 
such as China or India, this “ governmental intrusion ” or concern plays a legitimate role in 
the population problems that they face today. (Decew 1997, 56)
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eye- it was the uninvited ea r..."(Katz v United States 389 U.S. 350-351 [1967])
Therefore, as Stewart contends, an individual who seeks privacy in a telephone booth 
may rely upon the protection o f the Fourth Amendment. Once the person enters the 
booth, shuts the door so as not to be overheard, and pays the toll, he or she is entitled to 
the idea that whatever is said into the receiver w ill not be available to the world's 
inquisitive ears. Hence the government agents ignored what Stewart called "the 
procedure of antecedent justification.”  which is instrumental in the Fourth Amendment. 
(Katz V United States 389 U.S. 359 [1967]) This procedure is a required constitutional 
precondition due to the type o f electronic surveillance that was used, as discussed at 
length in a previous case.*” Since the surveillance in this case failed to meet the required 
precondition, the case was reversed.
What resulted from this case was that the courts had significantly changed the 
approach they use in determining whether or not searches and probable cause allowances 
violated the nature o f the Fourth Amendment. This approach came to be known as the 
privacy test. No longer were the physical boundaries o f the home the only area that was 
private, but the conversations between individuals over the phone, regardless o f the 
telephone’s location, were covered as well, as long as the individuals sought privacy from 
society.*^ In Justice John Harlan Marshall’s concurring opinion, he discussed this two­
pronged privacy test that the courts had developed loosely in relation to what locations 
qualify as areas o f presumed privacy protection. The first requirement was that a person
■” This constitutional precondition is discussed more in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 
323. 330 [1966] (Katz v United States 389 U.S. 362 [1967])
This understanding o f privacy is not only lim ited to telephone conversations, but also 
includes other aspects o f life, which would arguably be deemed more personal.
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had to exhibit an expectation o f privacy, even though it was a subjective expectation.
The second requirement was that society recognized this expectation as “ reasonable". 
(Katz V United States 389 U.S. 361 [1967]) Some have contended that it is extremely 
d ifficu lt to meet the first requirement, since the government can socialize its citizens on 
the areas that can be considered private or it can manipulate the law surrounding areas 
which could be deemed private by another society. The second requirement is just as 
d ifficu lt in that it is subjective to the beliefs o f society or those who interpret those 
beliefs- the government.
By 1968-1969. the government received a formidable blow for once again engaging 
in improper electronic surveillance. In Alderman v. United States. Ivanov v. United 
States, and Butenko v. United States, the petitioners were convicted o f conspiring to 
transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce. They had discovered, after their 
convictions and first appeals, that their place o f doing business in Chicago had been 
subject to electronic surveillance by the government. The Supreme Court held that the 
government was required to turn over all illegally obtained surveillance material to the 
defendants, whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. As discussed in Katz, 
the Fourth Amendment afforded privacy protections against the “ uninvited ear... . 
[Therefore,] oral statements, i f  illegally overheard, and their fruits are also subject to 
suppression." (Alderman et al v. United States 394 U.S. 171[1968]) The Court stated 
that the suppression o f evidence obtained in violation o f the Fourth Amendment can be 
only by those individuals whose rights were violated by the search."** Furthermore, after
■** “ In order to be a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure’ one must have 
been a victim o f a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as 
distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use o f evidence gathered
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the defendants receive the illegally-obtained material, they have the right to examine the 
information to determine what parts the government may use in build ing its case. This 
allows the defendants to build a case challenging the information that the government 
already has. W hile this seems unfair to the government, the objective was to allow only 
official eavesdropping and wiretapping obtained through probable cause and a warrant.'^ 
"Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, 
or worse, its disregard o f the character o f its own existence.”  (Alderman et al v. United 
States 394 U.S. 202[1968])
Since the 1968 Alderman decision, the courts have wavered between the 
government's right to know and that o f the individual’s right to privacy. The most recent 
case, seen in 1998 in the district courts, is Timothv R. McVeigh v. W illiam  S. Cohen, et 
al.'” Timothy McVeigh was a highly decorated noncommissioned officer who was the 
highest- ranking enlisted person aboard the USS Chicago, a nuclear submarine. On 
September 2. 1997. a civilian Navy volunteer received an electronic mail message via the 
America Online Service Provider (AO L) regarding a toy drive that she was coordinating 
for the submarine crew’s children. She noticed that the message box stated that the e- 
mail had originated from the alias "boysrch, ” but the text was signed "T im .”  Using the 
"member profile  directory”  option on A O L, she discovered that the subscriber was 
named Tim, lived in Honolulu, Hawaii, worked in the military, and identified his marital
as a consequence o f a search or seizure directed at someone else...”  (Alderman et al v. 
United States 394 U.S. 173(1968])
■'* “ In 1979, ...the Court held that because Congress must have recognized that most 
electronic bugs can be installed only by agents who secretly entered the premises, 
warrants authorizing such surveillance need not explicitly authorize covert entry.”  
(Biskupic and W itt 1997, 588)
Timothy McVeigh is no relation to the convicted Oklahoma C ity bomber.
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status as homosexual. Included in this profile were his listings o f favorite activities, 
which included "collecting pics o f other young studs”  and “ boywatching.”  What the 
profile lacked were his fu ll name, address, and phone number. A fter discovering this 
information, the volunteer proceeded to forward this information to her husband, who 
w as also a noncommissioned officer aboard the USS Chicago. Eventually, this material 
found its way to the captain o f the ship, who was M cVeigh’ s commanding officer. A t 
this point, the ship’s legal advisor was called in to investigate suspicions that Timothy 
McVeigh was in fact the "T im  ” listed under "boysrch.”  Formal investigations began, and 
the investigator instructed a paralegal assistant to contact America Online to get account 
information on the identity o f “ boysrch.”  Without identifying himself or providing a 
warrant, the assistant led the AO L representative to believe that he was an associate o f 
McVeigh’s, and that he was follow ing up on a previously sent fax from the company, and 
needed verification o f the handle “ boysrch.”  The AO L representative identified the 
handle to be Timothy McVeigh. McVeigh was then informed that he had violated the 
m ilita iy ’s policy o f “ Don’ t Ask. Don’ t Tell, Don’ t Pursue.” *' The Navy conducted an 
administrative discharge hearing, using the e-mail as its major form o f evidence. The 
decision ordered M cVeigh’ s discharge from the Navy, but the day prior to his discharge, 
he filed suit to win an injunction from the district coun to block the discharge. (Timothv
■*' The “ Don’ t Ask, Don’ t Tell, Don’ t Pursue ” policy was created under the National 
Defense Authorization Act o f 1994. This policy applied to homosexuals serving in the 
military. This policy was the result o f a political compromise, which allowed 
homosexuals to continue serving in the military as long as they did not disclose their 
sexual orientation to any person. In return, the m ilitary would not go out o f its way to 
seek out. and discharge, homosexuals. ( Timothv R. McVeigh v. W illiam  S. Cohen, et 
al.. C ivil Action 98-116, United States District Court for the D istrict o f Columbia 1998)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
R. McVeigh v. W illiam  S. Cohen, et al.. C iv il Action 98-116, United States District 
Court for the D istrict o f Columbia 1-3 [19981)
The district court found that McVeigh’s anonymous e-mail was not an admission that 
should trigger an investigation under this policy. Furthermore, Judge Stanley Sporkin 
held that the Navy had violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act o f 1986 [18 
u  s e . §§ 2073(b) (A )-(B ). (c)(1) (b)]. He wrote that the Electronic Communications 
Privacy .Act (ECPA) declares that government can obtain information from an ISP. “ only 
i f  a) it obtains a warrant issued under the Federal Rules o f Criminal Procedure or state 
equivalent; or b) it gives prior notice to the online subscriber and then issues a subpoena 
or receives a court order authorizing disclosure o f the information in question. ” (Timothv 
R. McVeigh v. W illiam  S. Cohen, et al.. C iv il Action 98-116. United States District 
Court for the D istrict o f Columbia 4-5 [1998]) In this particular case, the Navy had failed 
to comply with either o f these procedures. Moreover, Sporkin asserted that the 
government knew o r should have known that A O L was breaking the law by turning over 
the information w ithout a warrant, despite the fact the Navy solicited the information. 
Accordingly. M cVeigh ’s injunction was granted.
While this case does not address whether the “ Don’ t Ask, Don’ t Tell, Don’ t Pursue ” 
policy is constitutional, it does address a privacy issue. Not only does it affirm  the ECPA 
and the privacy rights o f users on all ISPs, but it also reinforces the Supreme Court’ s 
decision in Alderman stating that “ information obtained improperly can be suppressed 
where an individual’ s rights have been violated. In these days o f big brother,’ where 
through technology and otherwise the privacy interests o f individuals from all walks o f 
life  are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting
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these rights be obseiwed.”  (Timothv R. McVeigh v. W illiam  S. Cohen, et al.. Civil Action 
98-116. United States D istrict Court for the District o f Columbia.5 [1998])
O f course, over the twentieth century there have been several more cases in the coun 
system that continued to expand and redefine privacy in respect to electronic 
surveillance.*' The main conclusion one arrives at is the Court's sanction against 
government intrusion in a new technological realm. Furthermore, the Court's 
disapproval o f the invasion o f privacy using technological advancements has been seen 
over and over in many o f these cases. In fact, one could argue that the courts would turn 
a blind eye to some undesirable actions, as long as the constitutional right o f privacy for 
those prosecuted were not infringed upon. However, while courts have tended to hold a 
broad privacy position, especially in respect to the Fourth and F ifth Amendments. 
Congress and executive agencies have begun in their own ways to chip away and 
redefine, as well as violate, the courts’ privacy decisions.
*'Such examples include, but are not limited to the following cases: United States of 
.America v. Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda CR95-80106 [1995], and United States of 
America v. Robert Alan Thomas and Carleen Thomas C iv il Action 94-6648 &  94-6649, 
U.S. Court o f Appeals [1996]. ( See Footnote 34 for more examples)
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CHAPTER I I I
UNCLE SAM LEGISLATES 
As discussed in Chapter Two. over the years the federal court system established 
groundbreaking precedents in the controversial realm o f government intrusion versus 
citizens' rights.*'’ While the federal courts have defined the boundaries o f privacy in 
terms o f government involvement and the “ right to be left alone”  (Warren and Brandeis 
1890. 193). the legislature has found difficu lty creating law that balances the Supreme 
Court’s decisions and those o f the state's police and intelligence surveillance interests. 
This chapter w ill examine the legislature’s attempt at integrating these two opposing 
interests and discuss the legislative protection o f privacy and its implications or effects in 
the realm o f cyberspace.
Privacy in the Legislature
The realm o f privacy in an era o f advanced technology was not addressed in the 
United States Congress until the early part o f the twentieth century. One reason the
** While this argument tends to deal with privacy in the aspect o f information about one’s 
self, government intrusion, and eventually the relation to the Internet, there are many 
other aspects o f privacy that do not relate to electronic surveillance or the Internet. 
Unfortunately some o f those cases were not decided in the interests o f the person’s 
privacy interests, i.e., California Banker’s Association v. Schulz (1974), United States v. 
M ille r (1976). O liver v. United States (1984), Bowers v. Hardwick (1986). California v. 
Greenwood ( 1988), O ’Connor v. Ortega ( 1987), and Florida v. Rilev ( 1989).
35
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Congress began to address privacy, as stated in Chapter Two, resulted from the tensions 
between society’ s dim inishing role as a behavior-modifying agent, the rise in the 
individual’s sense o f self, and the government’s emerging role as the new moral 
•ontrolling mechanism. In traditional society, privacy was not an issue simply due to the 
• involvement in the community overrode those interests o f the self. A person was 
far more interested in being involved in the community fo r safety or security reasons, as 
well as for social interactions with others, such as to reproduce. Therefore, the whole 
community was aware o f almost every aspect o f a person. Many characteristics about a 
person and much o f that person’ s history were community knowledge. Today, many 
American citizens would deem this previous community knowledge as infringements 
upon an individual’ s private life. However, it would not be until the population increase 
in migration to larger cities took place that the emergence o f personal privacy realms 
would come to exist.
In America, not only did immigration to the cities lead to increased awareness o f 
privacy, due to the ability  to become anonymous and therefore private, but also as many 
Americans began to move west, the societal pressures o f traditional communal 
environments began to lessen. In short, neighbors knew less o f one another due to their 
physical separation from the community by large tracts o f  land. This increase in a lack o f 
knowledge about one’ s neighbor, as well as advocating the privacy o f the individual, in 
fact intensified the concepts o f personal privacy and their breaches under the increasing 
intrusions committed by the growing media and inquisitive law enforcement bodies.
Legal remedies for the offended would begin to take shape once the courts began to act in 
this area where the Congress would not.
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One o f the first laws to be created in protecting new technology and the citizens' right
to privacy against government intrusion was the Communications Act o f 1934.*'* The
original intent o f this statute was to regulate interstate and foreign communications that
traveled by radio wave or through cables/ wire (i.e., the telephone). As discussed in
section 4 o f the law, the newly established regulating body became known as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). The law also discusses the licensing o f radio
communications and transmissions (Title III), FCC's jurisdiction, government owned
stations and those o f foreign vessels, and the allocation o f facilities. Furthermore,
provisions for antitrust violations, establishing lotteries and announcements over the air
waves, operating and construction permits, distress signals and communications.
censorship and indecent language.** the employees o f a communication facility, third
parties, and the government are addressed as well.
The most important aspect o f this law. in terms o f  protected privacy for
communication such as the Internet, is section 605. This section discusses the
unauthorized publication o f communications. It exp lic itly  states that:
No person receiving...any interstate or foreign communication...shall divulge or 
publish the existence, contents, substance...or meaning thereof...to any other person 
other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney.. .or in response to a subpoena issued 
by a court o f competent jurisdiction... [Moreover,] no person not being authorized by 
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, 
contents, substance... or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. 
(U.S. Public Law No. 416 Sec. 605)
This law is known as U.S. Public Law No. 416 
**’ In respect to some free speech advocates who argue against the Communications Act. 
section 326 o f this act supports many o f their arguments stating that “ [n]othing in this Act 
shall be understood o r construed to give the Commission power o f censorship over the 
radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or 
condition shall... interfere with the right o f free speech by means o f radio 
communication.”  Unfortunately it also gives the provision that no person can utter 
obscene, indecent, or profane language over the radio.
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In this excerpt, “ person”  is defined as an individual, an association, a corporation, or a 
trust. However, in its implication, as used by the courts in Nardone et al v. United States. 
a person can also be a government agent. Thus the actual meaning o f the law implies that 
the government, as a third party, cannot interfere with or intercept a private 
communication between two individuals over a telephone line. As stated in Nardone. the 
plain words o f this section forbid anyone who is not the sender or the sender’s authorized 
person to intercept or divulge a communication that took place over the telephone lines.
One can argue about the meaning o f this law in relation to its applicability to law 
enforcement officials, as interpreted in Nardone. However, the question o f whether 
Congress meant to include the government and its right to protect the nation is debatable. 
The two questions at hand that involve this law are whether the sovereign is deprived o f a 
recognized or established principle or prerogative i f  this act includes them, or whether it 
implied that the sovereign or its officials are excluded from the language o f the law that 
embraces all people regardless o f occupation. Today, as in the late 1930s. one can look 
at the history o f Congress to decide their intent. Even though the members o f Congress 
had realized that the language neglected to be specific in matters concerning the 
government’s interception, one can see that they sought to remedy the situation by 
introducing bills that would lim it the government and its agents’ use o f wiretapping for 
crim inal convictions. (Nardone et al v. United States 302 U.S. 276 11937]) While none 
o f the amendments to the b ill ever mustered enough support to change the document, the 
realization by many members o f Congress and the numerous attempted corrections o f that 
mistake was made enough times for the courts to make judgment on this issue.
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In respect to the Internet, this law establishes protection against government 
monitoring o f e-mail, Internet surfing, and Internet phone calls. However, because o f the 
dial-up process and the need for an ISP in order to access the Internet, this law does not 
forbid employees o f ISPs from viewing a patron’s e-mail or the detailed layout o f web 
pages visited. The reason, located in Sec. 605, behind this employee access are the 
exemptions concerning the. “ assisting o f receiving" or “ assisting o f transmitting" 
communication phrases. Furthermore, in later privacy cases against employers, 
employees found that this clause also permitted managers to view their e-mails since it 
involved an aspect o f the employees’ work performance and production. (Aiana Shoars v. 
Epson America. Inc.. No. B 073234. Los Angeles Superior Court. [1990]) The main issue 
to understand, though, is that third parties not related to the transmitting or receiving o f a 
certain communication, cannot view private communications or access them. As seen in 
earlier judicial decisions, this plays a major role in the government's ability to intrude 
upon an individual’ s right to Internet privacy.
The Communications Act o f 1934, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, can be seen 
as the groundwork in privacy legislation for the Internet. However some critics, e.g.. 
organizations such as the Ethical Spectacle and the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, have argued that it is by far one of the worst written laws, as discussed in 
articles such as “ The Communications Act o f 1934 Was a Mistake.”  (Ethical Spectacle 
1996. I) However, most o f their criticism is against section 326 o f the law, which 
discusses censorship and indecent language. It states in two sentences that the FCC 
cannot censor anyone, yet no one can utter any “ obscene, indecent or profane language 
by means o f radio communication.”  (U.S. Public Law No. 416 Sec. 326) In respect to the
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Internet, one could argue that the FCC, as a government established body, could invade a 
Netizen’s right to privacy, through the interception o f e-mail only for the sake o f 
enforcing the obscenity clause o f section 326. In addition the amendments made to the 
Communications Act o f 1934 by the Communications Decency Act are the main points 
o f contention seen in today’s freedom o f speech arguments.
As seen im plic itly  in the previous chapter through the increase in jud icia l activity, in 
the late 1960s. there was a growth in government surveillance techniques, as well as 
government intervention in what could be termed as private realms.*” W ith the courts 
favoring personal privacy over government intervention, the Congress and the public 
became increasingly aware o f law enforcement’s use o f electronic surveillance 
techniques. In addition, the Communications Act o f 1934 did not cover all privacy 
interests. Congress later felt that the federal collection, use, and dissemination o f 
personal information affected the privacy o f the individual citizens. Coupled with the 
increasing use o f computers and new technology, not to mention the possible misuses o f 
that information, they believed that citizens faced an increased harm, and that their 
protections were in danger.
As a result. Congress passed the Privacy Act o f 1974, also referred to as Public Law 
93-579. Embodied in this act were the 1964 Freedom o f Information Act’s principles and 
the 1972 Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems to the Secretary o f 
the Department o f Health, Education, and Welfare’ s response to the public’ s and the 
legislature’s concern that the government was turning into “ Big Brother. ” The committee
*” See footnote 33 for other government intrusions, as well as Timothv R. McVeigh v. 
W illiam  S. Cohen, et al.. C iv il Action 98-116, U.S. D istrict Court for the District o f 
Columbia [1998]
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suggested five principles that it believed would protect privacy from Big Brother and the
developing little brothers in this new information age.*’  These principles state that:
There must be no data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret. There 
must [also] be a way for an individual to find out what information about him/her is 
on record and how it is used. [Moreover, there] must be a way to correct or amend a 
record o f identifiable information about him/her. [Additionally, there] must be a way 
for an individual to prevent information about him/ her that was obtained for one 
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his/her 
consent. [And finally, any] organization creating, maintaining, using, or 
disseminating records o f identifiable personal data must guarantee the re liability o f 
the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse. 
(Henderson 1999, 19)
Eventually these five principles would also be the foundation for the Electronic Privacy 
Act o f 1986.
In the Privacy Act o f 1974, not only was the purpose o f the act to protect the five 
principles mentioned before, but also to allow for a sixth principle which stated that there 
had to be a way for a person to bring c iv il suit for any damages incurred as a result o f 
w illfu l or intentional actions. (U.S. Public Law 93-579.42-43) Consequently the act 
provided for the accountability o f federal agencies and private corporations on certain 
disclosures, the accessibility o f records, federal agency requirements and rules, c iv il 
remedies, and criminal penalties and exemptions. The act also went so far as to cover the 
actions or rights o f legal guardians, archival records, mailing lists, and sanctions against 
the government. Unfortunately, while the citizen's privacy became more protected from 
the federal government, the act still neglected to cover the privacy rights guaranteed from
*’  L ittle  brothers are corporations or companies who collect data on individuals for 
business uses. Eventually, this data would be collected, sold, or exchanged to other 
companies, who could in turn keep extensive dossiers on an individual’s personal life, 
knowing their shopping preferences, taste in food, their yearly income, and what they 
owned. (Henderson 1999, 19)
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private corporations as seen in section 5. subsection 522a (m) (2). (U.S. Public Law 93- 
579. 50)
W hile this act in itia lly  sought to help citizens learn about the information 
collected on them and how to correct and protect that information, many critics, such as 
the American C iv il Liberties Union (ACLU). have found this act useless due to poor 
implementation and the lack o f enforcement. Furthermore, problems w ith  the act are 
exacerbated since there were no appropriated funds for the enforcement o f provisions 
relating to privacy. As a result, most government agencies did not bother to appoint 
people to oversee privacy implementation. The Office o f Management and Budget 
(0M B ). which orig inally was appointed this task o f privacy enforcement because no 
other agency would volunteer to act as the enforcing agency, found it could not fu lf ill the 
required enforcement in conjunction with its other duties. After privacy enforcement by 
the 0M B  failed, no other federal agency volunteered to become the enforcer for privacy. 
Thus, without the enforcing bodies to define the terms o f the law and penalize lack o f 
compliance, agencies became their own judges o f whether or not they fu lfilled  the 
requirements o f the law correctly. (Strum 1998, 159-154)
Nevertheless, some critics, such as Harry Henderson, still contend that, while 
cumbersome, the Privacy Act o f 1974 does provide citizens with legal remedies should 
they suspect the government has inappropriate or inaccurate information about them, or 
has distributed that information maliciously. That person need only determine which 
agency has the information and then request it. The only exceptions to their inquiries on 
their own information would be files located in law enforcement agencies or intelligence 
agencies. (Henderson 1999, 33)
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Following the 1974 Privacy Act_and the Freedom o f Information Act, there was a 
plethora o f privacy legislation that was passed in the 1980s. One o f the first pieces o f 
legislation was dubbed the Privacy Protection Act o f 1980.^* This act stipulates when 
searches are authorized, as well as who is allowed to perform them.^^ The prominent 
themes in this document are the requirement o f warrants and the principles o f the 4“’ 
.Amendment. In essence, law enforcement cannot perform searches or seize any “ work 
product" or “ documentary material" without a warrant. (U.S. Public Law 96-440, section 
42 U. S. C. 2000aa (a)- 2(XX)aa-l 1 (a) (4) 95-99) Materials can be seized only i f  there is 
probable cause to believe that the person possessing the material is involved in a crime 
and the material is evidence o f this crime or may relate to national security. This 
includes materials intended for publication by journalists and publishers in the 
preparation o f newspapers, broadcasts, books, and other types o f public communications.
In addition, this act forces law enforcement to utilize subpoenas and citizen 
cooperation to obtain evidence in respect to First Amendment activities. As in previous 
acts, this statute also provides for legal compensation for damages should a government 
agent, following the orders o f his/her agency, violate any portion o f this law and wrongly 
seize an item or search an area. The implication provided in this body o f work is that 
protection o f private documents or information can extend to materials intended for 
publication on online systems as well as electronic bulletin board systems (BBS).
One criticism o f this act relates to section 2000aa-12. This section discusses the 
binding nature o f the guidelines discussed in the b ill, as well as disciplinary action and
Also known as U.S. Public Law 96-440.
39 Only those involved in the investigation can do the searching and i f  need be the seizing 
o f items.
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the legal process for noncompliance with the law. In two rather long sentences that seem 
to contradict the earlier provision in section 2000aa-6, it states that the violation o f the 
guidelines would subject an employee or an officer only to administrative disciplinary 
action. Furthermore, i f  the issue is related to compliance or the failure to comply, there 
can be no litigation, and the court cannot suppress or exclude evidence. What one could 
argue is that, hypothetically, i f  an enterprising officer, who fails to obtain a warrant, 
decides to seize information due to his concern that i f  he did not there might be a breach 
o f national security or someone would incur bodily harm, the victim  o f his search could 
not bring legal suit against the officer for seizure o f his/her items. Moreover, i f  the 
officer is correct in his assumptions, he might receive slight disciplinary action, such as a 
verbal warning, but cannot be held crim inally or c iv illy  liable. However, the agency can 
be held liable depending upon the violation.
While one could argue the slippery slope implications o f this provision and how, in 
the wrong hands, the government would not be held accountable for much, this act has in 
fact helped some victims reclaim seized items from the government. In the case o f Steve 
Jackson Games. Inc. v. United States Secret Service, the Secret Service organized an 
investigation into the hacker group called the “ Legion o f Doom.”  Their belief was that 
the organization had stolen confidential information about the emergency Bell South 911- 
phone system, which was actually available to the public for a few dollars, compliments 
o f the Freedom o f Information Act. Through much guesswork in their investigative 
processes, the Secret Service falsely assumed a computer BBS game system known as the
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“ Illum inati”  was connected with another BBS, called the “ Phoenix.” '**’ They believed the 
operator o f the “ Phoenix”  BBS, Lloyd Blankenship, was an associate o f the Legion o f 
Doom, because the site happened to have the “ confidential”  manual on its board for 
downloading. They connected the “ Illum inati,”  which was owned and operated by Steve 
Jackson Games, to the “ Phoenix”  BBS through Blankenship, who happened to be an 
employee o f Steve Jackson Games. (Henderson 1999, 77)
On March 1, 1990, the Secret Service raided Steve Jackson Games and confiscated 
thousands o f computer disks. In addition, they seized all computer equipment and files 
used by the company. The agents believed they struck pay dirt when they uncovered an 
alleged “ how-to" manual for computer criminals. In actuality, the document in question 
was a rule book for a role-playing game that was being developed around the idea o f a 
futuristic high tech society. (Henderson 1999, 77; Center for Democracy and Technology 
2001 . 1)
Steve Jackson repeatedly asked the Secret Service for the return o f his seized items, 
after they had finished copying them, but the agency ignored his requests. His lack o f 
business material for the game shop, which included the developed new games as well as 
the role/ rule books for current ongoing games, eventually forced him into bankruptcy.
As a result Jackson sued the Secret Service. (Henderson 1999, 77)
The Texas District court found that, under the Privacy Act, the Secret Service had 
violated Jackson’s rights. Furthermore, the judge noted, “ while the content o f these 
publications are not similar to those o f daily newspapers, news magazines, or other
This BBS did happen to have hacker-related conversation and material on it as well as 
the Bell South 911 information.
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publications usually thought o f by this court as disseminating information to the public, 
these products come within the literal language of the Protection A c t." (Henderson 1999. 
77) Jackson was awarded damages/* but the impact o f both the case and the act were 
reflected in law enforcement’ s realization that privacy statutes, and First and Fourth 
.Amendment rights had to be considered in the realm o f computer communications and 
documents.
A  small but significant and effective privacy act, which was bom in the 1980s. was 
the Cable Communications Policy Act o f 1984.*' The act protects subscriber privacy by 
hindering cable operators or third parties from monitoring cable consumer buying and 
viewing habits. Likewise, it prohibits the collection o f “ personally identifiable 
information" (P Il), unless authorized by the subscriber. (U.S. Public Law 98-549, section 
47 U. S. C. § 551 (c) 101) The exceptions to this rule are i f  the PH is needed in order to 
render a service by the operator or the PH is needed to conduct legitimate business 
activity related to the service, for instance sending a bill. (U.S. Public Law 98-549, 
section 47 U. S. C. § 551 (c) (2) (A ) 101) In addition the act places a heavy burden of 
proof on law enforcement agencies seeking court orders for consumer information. The 
implications o f this b ill are that it w ill extend to the new online services provided by 
cable companies, and that, eventually, this might allow for the protection o f an ISP’s 
members’ PH against government intrusion.
The end o f the 1980s brought the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act 
(ECPA) o f 1986. The EC PA was an update to Title HI o f the Omnibus Crime Control
* ’ Unfortunately this case still is unresolved, since the appellate court reversed the 
decision in favor o f the government. (Center for Democracy and Technology 2001, 1) 
* ' Also referred to as U.S. Public Law 98-549.
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and Safe Street Act o f 1968. Originally, Title I I I  o f the Omnibus b ill regulated the use of 
government wiretaps and hidden microphones, requiring that the consent o f one party be 
obtained prior to the tap and/ or that a court order be obtained. In addition, it prohibited 
wiretapping o f employees by private parties or public investigators. Title I II  also 
established a procedure that requires a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance and the 
use o f wiretaps. While T itle  I I I  protected aural communication transmitted through wire 
or cables, it failed to protect e-mail content as well as communications over cordless 
telephones. Obviously this opened the door to unrestricted government electronic 
surveillance on w ireless transmissions and non-aural communications such as e-mail and 
faxes. (Strum 1998, 141-142)
As mentioned before, the ECPA was an update to T itle  HI o f the Omnibus bill. This 
act not only protected previous communication technology, such as two-party phone 
calls, but also provided protections for all new forms o f d ig ita l and computer 
communications. This included communications via video, electronic transmissions, text, 
data, and audio, which were all equated to that o f a phone conversation within the home 
or that o f first class mail.*^ Like the Communications A ct o f  1934, the ECPA included 
protections against interception and disclosure o f communications. Furthermore, the 
sanctions in the ECPA applied not only to the government, but also to private companies 
and individuals as well. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2511) A fter the act became law. 
government was required to obtain a court order or the prio r consent o f one party before 
initiating any electronic surveillance through a wiretap, whether accessing real time
This did not include cordless phones or tone only paging devices. (Strum 1999, 158; 
Rubinstein 1999, 3)
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communications or stored messages. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2511 (2) (a) -  (b) 
107-108) Restrictions against private companies were reflective o f the principles stated in 
the Cable Communications Policy Act and the 1934 Communications Act. As in those 
two previous acts, the only acceptable monitoring o f communication by a third party, 
such as the service provider, was for information received and distributed in the normal 
course o f business for providing a specific service, such as some sort o f mechanical or 
service quality control check. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2512 (2) (a))
The advantages to the ECPA not only included those o f broader protections for a 
growing realm o f communication technology, but it also clarified invasions o f privacy 
and codified protections against those invasions, as seen in Timothy R. McVeigh v. 
W illiam  S. Cohen, et al. in Chapter Two. In addition it sought to curb government 
surveillance and recreational eavesdropping, unless committed by an employee’ s 
employer in respect to work e-mail or business telephone communications.
The largest criticism o f the ECPA came from the AC LU , which originally endorsed 
the act, stating that it protected civil liberties. Yet since the signing of the act into law. 
the ECPA has been ridiculed for its failure to protect and enforce certain electronic 
communication procedures. Moreover, critics have pointed to key discrepancies between 
the actual law and the original versions, which were promoted by c ivil libertarians. 
(Rubinstein 1999, 3)
One main contention lies within section 2516, which lists a host of prosecutable 
violations, including bribery, child pornography, counterfeiting, hacking inaccessible 
information and the transportation o f stolen property. A  critic from The Nation called 
this “ a wish list for the law-enforcement community”  (Rubinstein 1999, 3) Not only did
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the ECPA substantially increase the list o f federal crimes permitting the use o f 
government electronic surveillance, but it also increased the number o f Justice 
Department officia ls who can give judicial approval for court orders such as warrants. 
(U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2516 (2))
Critics also argue that ECPA provisions regarding access to certain subscriber 
information has been made easier for law enforcement agencies to obtain, since in certain 
instances there is no provision for judicial review. Requests for customer records from 
service providers need be accompanied only by a statement that certifies the information 
requested pertains to an investigation that involves the interception o f foreign 
intelligence. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2511 (2) (e)- (f)) This easy accessibility 
enhances arguments questioning the certifying procedures o f law enforcement officials 
and service providers, since the original intention o f the ECPA was designed to protect 
communications. (Rubinstein 1999, 3)
Some final criticisms o f the ECPA result from the revised definition o f “ content,”  
which seems to exclude the existence o f “ communication,”  as well as the identities o f the 
parties involved in the transmission. (Rubinstein 1999, 3-4) The actual text defines 
“ contents" as “ any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning o f that 
communication.”  (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2510 (8)) However, the definition, as 
the critic Geoffrey Rubinstein has pointed out, lacks what is the expression o f 
communication between two parties. What this may mean is that there might be a closer 
scrutiny of calling and e-mail correspondence patterns. In addition, after September 11, 
2001, Americans have seen an increase in specialized surveillance programs, such as 
DCS 1000, discussed in Chapter One. One could argue that the ECPA’s 2511 provision
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w ill eventually allow for fu ll government surveillance o f the populace, which would 
include monitoring political groups, student action committees, and even communities.
To move further in the argument, even though government must apply fo r a wiretap in 
order to have access to the substance o f a communication, a tap and trace would allow the 
government to define invisible social networks and identify key members within those 
social groups.
In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act. This act, resembling the 
Cable Communications Policy Act o f 1984, dealt with the privacy o f  customer 
information and FCC implementation. In general, the act states that every 
telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality o f  information, not 
only relating to the customers, but also relating to other carriers and equipment 
manufacturers. In addition, this act establishes provisions for the use o f  information 
received from other carriers, as well as the ability o f the carrier’s agents to access 
customer information. Tlie law’s implications in the cyberworld w ould tend to protect 
the information o f a user more securely than previous bills had. Unfortunately, this law 
also grants carriers the ability to use telemarketing advertisements.
The most recent and arguably controversial law passed is the U n iting  and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act o f 2001. This act was a response to the 
terrorist actions committed against the United States on September 11, 2001. As the 
nation grieved for the victims in the airplane hijackings and crashes, this b ill, which was 
initiated in the House o f Representatives, was quickly created, amended, and signed into 
law within a record five weeks, with only one dissent. The 345-page b ill makes changes
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to over 15 different statutes as well as providing analysis and explanation to sections of 
the b ill relating to new technological developments and online communications and 
activities. (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2(X)1, 1)
The b ill includes a plethora o f information, such as some provisions that apply 
directly to combating terrorism, while other provisions seem to create and enhance laws 
governing the cyber-realm and regular non-terrorist activities. Such provisions include 
creating a counterterrorism fund, increasing funds to the FBI, expanding a national 
electronic crime task force, enhancing surveillance procedures, strengthening criminal 
laws against terrorism, and prosecuting international money laundering. Also mentioned 
are techniques on counteracting terrorist financing, protecting the national borders, 
establishing more stringent codes for immigration, removing "obstacles”  in investigating 
terrorism, providing for the victims o f terrorist attacks, and improving intelligence 
capabilities in both national and foreign spheres. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2001.) 
Perhaps one o f the most controversial aspects o f the b ill is that o f information sharing 
between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, thus creating a centralized 
law enforcement and intelligence body. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2001, Title V II; 
Sec. 701)
While law and immigration agencies have lauded the b ill fo r unifying and increasing 
facilities in an abundance o f fields, many critics, from the AC LU  to online journalists and 
scholars, have attacked the bill for its confusing and intrusive language. Some critics, 
such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, contend that Congress had failed to study the 
b ill and that there was not sufficient time allotted to hear testimony from experts outside 
the law enforcement field where the changes w ill definitely be felt. In addition, critics
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state that the government, which curbs some c iv il liberties in the law, failed to show that 
the reason they could not detect the planning o f any terrorist acts stemmed from 
compromising previous laws and court judgments that established citizens’ c iv il liberties. 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation 2001, 2) Moreover, this legislation increases the power 
o f the president and executive branch subordinates; at the same time it reduces the power 
o f congressional oversight in conducting domestic as well as foreign wars. (Herman,
2001 2) The problem which arises is Congress’s refusal to maintain an active role in the 
oversight o f the executive agencies. This weakens the federal check on the executive 
branch since the judiciary cannot make a decision until a controversy from this b ill is 
brought forth to them.
Furthermore, in the surveillance provisions listed under Title II o f the law. there is a 
decrease in jud ic ia l oversight o f government surveillance, as well as a provision that 
allows a judicial magistrate to issue a court order for law enforcement officials pertaining 
to information outside his/ her district. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2001, T itle  II; Sec. 
215. Sec. 219) In essence, the surveillance provisions in the b ill resemble the standards 
o f the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act o f 1978 (FISA). Title 11. like FISA, allows 
for the increase in surveillance o f activities, even when there is no probable cause. In 
addition, according to T itle  II, FISA warrants may now be used against citizens even i f  
the purpose o f the investigation is not to gather intelligence. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 
2001, Title II: Sec. 225) This allows for the extension o f nation-wide "roving wiretaps”  
to be used on intelligence wiretaps, which are secretly authorized and do not need
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probable cause.** (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2(X)1, 3) The possible privacy issue is 
whether or not a person being monitored, via electronic surveillance, w ill cause other 
users o f that phone to be monitored. In addition, this law may restrict provisions created 
in the Katz and Alderman decisions, such as the two-pronged privacy test and the 
suppression o f evidence against individuals whose rights were violated.
Advantages in this act to the average citizen and Netizen are few. Congress did place 
a sunset clause in Title II, section 224, o f the provision, but this applies only to parts of 
the law. In Title II, only thirteen out o f twenty-five provisions w ill expire on December 
31, 2005. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2(X)1. T itle  II: Sec. 224) Those that w ill not 
expire include the continued sharing of grand ju ry  information (section 203 a and c), the 
increased number o f FISA judges (section 208), and the scope of subpoenas for records 
o f electronic communications, which overrides the Cable Communications Act in respect 
to services offered by the providers (section 211). In addition, the modifications for “ pen 
and trap”  (section 216), single jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism (section 219), 
increased citizen assistance to law enforcement (section 222), and section 225 concerning 
FISA wiretap immunities w ill not expire.
The main problems o f this b ill are staggering. Not only is the law incredibly difficult 
to read for the average citizen, but one would need to go on a treasure hunt in order to 
comprehend the implications in the other laws that this act changes through amendments 
and edited provisions. Moreover, as some critics argue, it is obvious that close 
consideration o f this b ill was never taken. Section 217 o f T itle 11 o f the b ill contradicts
** Roving wiretaps are those wiretaps placed on all the phones that a specific person 
utilizes.
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earlier amendments to the ECPA in section 203-(b) (6) (2) (B). In addition, it limits a 
person's due process rights under section 223 o f Title II, and relieves the government o f 
accountability through delayed warrants and amendments to the ECPA. There are 
actually so many criticisms o f this b ill that it  is surprising that Congress and the President 
allowed it to pass with so many questionable passages and so little  research.
O f course, as mentioned before, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have 
found this b ill to be a boon to their previous information communication problems. The 
new law strengthens a new C lA -FB I alliance in two ways. First, the C IA  is explicitly 
allowed to decide who w ill be targeted and the information to be retrieved on domestic 
investigations. In addition, the C IA  is given fu ll access to information on citizens that 
has been gathered by U.S. law enforcement agencies and grand juries. This might in turn 
allow the FBI to launch investigations into dissident groups or on an individual suspect 
whom they believe to have ties to terrorist or foreign intelligence agencies, no matter how 
remote the connection may be. (Dreyfuss 2(X)2, 32)
Additional advantages may include the increased information local and state law 
enforcement agencies can now access through the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTF). The JTTF and the USA PATRIOT ACT may help these local law enforcement 
agencies rebuild their intelligence units, so that they may have the ability to solve and 
tackle local terrorist problems. The only issue that the Justice Department fears is state 
and local agencies trampling the remaining privacy rights and c iv il liberties o f groups and 
individuals who voice extreme political opinions. “ Precisely because terrorism is a 
political crime, usually perpetrated by organizations with politica l agendas, antiterrorism 
intelligence can often mean surveillance o f groups and individuals for their opinions and
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not their acts.”  (Dreyfuss 2(X)2. 33) As a result, the monitoring o f political, racial, 
religious, and special interests, such as those concerning the environment, w ill be key 
factors in surveillance.
Through the development o f legislation from 1934 until 2001, communications 
privacy has faced dramatic changes. Until the passage o f the 2001 US.A PATRIOT .ACT. 
one could almost assume that privacy protections on the Internet were moving more in 
favor o f personal privacy over that o f government intrusion. Yet, with all violent actions, 
one must assume an extreme reaction to take place. Unfortunately Congress’s reactions 
to the terrorist actions o f September 11, 2001 have proven to be less favorable to 
Netizens' rights in cyberspace.
One hope to this outcome is that a case w ill present itself to the Supreme Court, and it 
w ill declare the unconstitutionality o f this statute. While this seems unlikely, perhaps the 
ability to assert jud ic ia l power in the form o f judicia l review w ill tempt the justices to 
once again take a leading ethical role in the United States, as they did with Brown v.
Board o f Education. The other hope would be that Congress would see the error o f this 
law and repeal it before it allows grave injustices not only to American society, but also 
to American Netizens. The last and most unlikely prospect w ill come from the American 
voters. Perhaps Americans w ill see the error in this legislation and make demands to 
rectify these privacy invasions by holding the government accountable, through either 
their congressional representatives or their president. I f  none o f these actions come to 
pass, laws governing the cyberworld w ill not support the claims that some actions and 
communications in this realm are protected. As a result, Netizens may find the right to 
privacy a privilege allowed more so than an established prerogative.
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A  NEW HOPE
Throughout this analysis, the clashes between the realm o f electronic privacy rights 
and government's new crime solving applications have repeatedly turned up. The 
creation and use o f programs such as DCS 1000, Echelon, and encryption keys are just 
some methods that government can use to capture criminals. However, those same 
programs, when placed in the hands o f an unchecked agency, can mean disaster to the 
constitutional rights o f Americans. Shadows o f McCarthyism and images reminiscent of 
those found in the movie “ Gattica”  and James Orwell’s book Nineteen Eightv-Four creep 
into the minds o f Americans. However, in the aftermath o f the September 11‘*' violence, 
many Americans who at one time defended their privacy rights now condone the 
government’ s intrusions, regardless o f whether those intrusions protect them against 
harm in this integrated flesh and cyber-world. A t the end o f Chapter One, two questions 
that this analysis focused on were raised. They are: “ Is there a protected constitutional 
right to privacy [in respect to the Internet],”  and i f  so, "who or w hat w i l l  protect that 
right?”
In answer to the first question, the United States Supreme Court has said that the 
constitutional privacy rights o f the individual do exist on many levels, including the new 
areas o f communications. In addition, the Court stated that government could not intrude 
upon those privacy rights, even i f  the right is exercised in a public area. Government’s
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unwanted intrusion is a breach to one’s right to privacy, and should not be condoned 
unless government can prove that there are sufficient reasons for encroaching upon the 
citizen’s rights. Those reasons must be provocative enough to solicit a magistrate’s 
concession to issue a court order such as in the investigation o f suspicious or illegal 
activity or in the case o f a national security breach. However, victims o f privacy 
violations also have a burden to bear. Privacy does not encompass all aspects or realms 
o f life. An individual must give up some autonomy when he or she enters into the social 
and political realm o f society. The debate lies in where the realm o f privacy ends and the 
realm o f public information must begin. Those people seeking retribution for privacy 
invasions must be able to prove that their expected private communications with another 
individual took place in a location or realm that would be considered “ reasonably 
private ” in the eyes o f society. (Katz v United States 389 U.S. 361 [1967])
For obvious reasons, the question o f "reasonably private ” areas versus not so private 
areas needed to be addressed. As discussed in the third chapter. Congress assumed the 
role o f defining what privacy rights should be expected in different areas, especially in 
terms o f abstract, technology-created areas due to new innovations in computer 
programming and mechanical engineering. Until the most recent USA PATRIOT ACT, 
Congress had upheld and attempted to clarify judicial decisions upholding the privacy 
rights o f an individual in the technological or abstract world. However, since the 
enactment o f the USA PATRIOT ACT. legislation upholding privacy rights has been 
weakened, i f  not dismantled.
As the courts and the legislature have maintained, there is a constitutional right to 
privacy in respect to the Internet. The problem that now exists is how much privacy is
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protected on the Internet. As the end o f Chapter Three suggests, this question can be 
answered only through the courts or the legislature. Until either branch deigns to answer 
this new dilemma, American Netizens can expect increasing problems and intrusions in 
their daily cyber-relations with other Netizens.
In answering the second question of, “ who or what w ill protect this right to privacy,”  
•American citizens must look to a source other than themselves, since the U.S. courts have 
not established communication privacy as being a real constitutional right instead o f an 
instituted statutory right. In the evolution o f the Internet, it was discussed that the 
removal o f government involvement caused a surge in cyber crime. U.S. privatized 
industry could not adequately regulate the transgressions that took place and invaded the 
personal privacy o f American users. In fact, most users were not sophisticated enough in 
the protection o f their own privacy rights, which helped produce the current problems 
that people face today in respect to cyber-stalking and identity theft. As a result, a cyber- 
goveming agency and accompanying legislation must be created to protect the privacy 
rights infringed upon by the government (through use o f the USA PATRIOT ACT) and 
cybercriminals.
Possible policy proposals for the creation o f a new body and privacy protecting 
legislation would need to entail four premises that w ill allow the law to be dynamic 
enough that it may be interpreted to govern new innovations in technology over time.
The new law would also need to be applicable to the privacy problems encountered in the 
cyber world. By the word applicable, it is meant that the law must be reasonable or must 
encompass possible problems that could arise. Fanciful propositions would only 
contribute to the edict’ s inability to mandate what would be considered legal and illegal.
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Moreover, the laws and the governing body would not only have to apply to the United 
States, but also to an international audience, since the problems that are found on the 
Internet not only apply to the United States but also are ones that affect all countries that 
are linked to the Internet. Moreover, there needs to be a standard international law since 
each country’ s statutes, including the United States', has failed to establish adequate 
protection and institutions.
One o f the first conditions that must be established in this possible new policy would 
be a universal provision that would be consented to by all countries, since one country’ s 
enforcement o f laws w ill affect other Netizens around the globe. As it  is, the current 
problem with many privacy laws involving the World Wide Web is that countries believe 
they can dictate their regulations to other countries’ users. This can currently be seen in 
the Internet child pornography cases in Germany and the United Kingdom and their 
dilemma in relation to extradition problems involving users who send il l ic it  child 
photographs from Singapore, which has loose child pornography laws. In addition, in 
respect to remailers, many times foreign anonymous remailers have refused to release 
users’ identities to foreign countries. What this currently implies is that, i f  a hacker stalks 
an individual or releases a computer virus through e-mail, there is no guarantee that the 
hacker can be found and, i f  need be, extradited from a certain country. (Murphy 2001, 
24-27)
However, i f  a universal agreement between all countries exists, cyber criminals may 
be held more accountable for their actions violating the privacy rights o f individuals in 
other countries. The parties in a country that experienced the violation could address the 
suspect without having to negotiate through the bureaucratic mazes o f the other
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countries’ extradition laws. Furthermore, as suggested in several European 
recommendations and supports, by sharing the experience o f problems encountered over 
the Internet, the various national authorities can work together to adopt a coherent 
strategy for applying general principles on issues concerning data protection. (EU 
Directive 1998, 2.1.1)
In addition, in order to effectively enforce privacy protections and cyber law 
infringements, there must be a universally accepted governance body. A  possible model 
could be the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, unlike the IAEA, 
the proposed body would need the power to enforce legislation and pursue violators. The 
United States’ Federal Trade Commission’ s Privacy Initiative Team also might be a 
potential model; however, like the IAEA, it too does not have the political clout, and in 
addition it lacks the initiative to take a firm  stand on privacy policies, and so must also be 
ruled out. (Long 1997, 107) Possible sanctions on countries that accept the agreement, 
yet fail to implement local enforcement, could include trade sanctions and Internet 
boycotts o f country originated sites. Perhaps even an extreme sanction might be an 
Internet blackout towards the country.*^ However, one big problem w ith international 
agencies is having adequate powers to enforce regulations and the accompanying 
violations. Consequently, many Netizens feel that private industry regulation and 
Netizen boycotts would be more effective. (Long 1997, 108) Yet as discussed, self-
In terms o f a “ blackout”  this could mean one o f two things. Either the country’s ISPs 
are temporarily shut down, or all sites originating from that country are displayed as 
negative and inactive. For example i f  the background is white, it becomes black or gray 
and the hypertext is neutralized.
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regulation is ineffective in today’s world, and thus a state supported agency must be 
created.
Secondly, while programs such as Echelon and DCS 1000 w ill probably never be shut 
down, there must be another way to ensure the privacy o f law abiding Netizens while at 
the same time pursuing illegal actions committed by cybercriminals. A possible proposal 
might be to secure a database with known “ hacker" or cybercriminal trails.
Unfortunately, anonymity, which goes hand in hand with privacy on the web, needs to be 
sacrificed when tracking known Internet-sophisticated computer felons so that other 
Netizens’ privacy rights can be ensured.
Possible future implications might be stricter stipulations on the use o f anonymous 
remailers and the purchase o f  encryption software. However, this provision would in no 
way require companies to give the new agency all access keys to their encryption 
software, nor would it provide that remailers furnish a complete list o f users to the 
regulating body. Remailers could voluntarily offer a repeated offending user’s name to 
the agency, should the remailers or private companies deem the transgression meriting 
punishment. An example o f some transgressions could be a self-replicating virus or an e- 
bomb. Political speech, for example, would not be a punishable transgression but a 
protected right in the cyber world. In respect to encryption software, registering the 
purchaser at the time o f purchase may be a possible option, but not a requirement. One 
main reason is that the purchaser could always acquire an encryption program somewhere 
without registering him or herself, such as over the black market. Remember, the premise 
o f encryption software is to protect private communications and so access to those 
communications defeats the purpose o f the program. As a result, Netizens’ permission to
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law enforcement accessing personal encrypted messages should be supported over 
legislation permitting access to encrypted information by law enforcement agencies.
In addition, there needs to be a universal standard o f what information can be deemed 
"publicly accessible.”  or "public information." One o f the problems Netizens face, as 
seen in the McVeigh case, is the easy access to personal information, such as gender and 
sexual preference. On some ISPs or BBSs, one's personal information might also include 
the last time a user logged on. his/her home address, phone number, and employer.
These particulars need to be inaccessible to the average Netizen. In addition, one's credit 
information, medical history, and personal identification number or social security 
number also need to be made unavailable. A ll this "personal information" can be used to 
persecute a person, harass individuals, or perform fraudulent activities against that 
individual. Personal identity on the Internet must be protected by this agency since ISPs 
and the U.S. government have failed to do so. Moreover, there have been initiatives in 
the past that allow a user to "opt-out”  or "opt-in”  for advertisement requests as well as 
privacy controls. (Long 1997, 108) Unfortunately, these too do not have an impact on a 
user, who must become proactive and contact certain sites should they not want their 
information or "clickstream”  to be sold or traded.*^
Finally, the agency should perform random ISP checks on personal privacy. The 
philosophy behind random checks can be found in the retail world’ s "private shopper.”  
The "private shopper”  is an individual who inspects the quality o f service provided in an 
average shopping experience. The experience usually begins once the shopper enters the
*** A clickstream is a marketeering software tool used to track areas o f cyberspace that 
consumers click to w ith  a mouse. This information received may include what web sites 
were visited, the pages accessed, and the time spent on each page.
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door o f the facility , and ends after s/he completes a purchase and leaves the premises.
The shopper then rates his/ her experience, and notes areas needing improvement, or 
areas/ actions that were neglected and/or violated the establishment's house rules. The 
belief is that, through random checks, services can be upgraded and maintained. This 
same philosophy can be applied to the ISPs. The premise is that random checks through 
an ISP on an isolated individual user w ill prove whether measures are taken to establish 
privacy controls allow ing the distribution o f minimal personal information. This may 
lead to a decline in the information trading market and identity theft. Services that a 
provider might offer could include the distribution o f encryption software, identity 
certification or d ig ita l signatures, and stringent privacy regulation. The goal is to lim it 
the public’ s accessibility to any specific user’s information, thus lim iting the possibility 
for a breach in security.
In the case o f extradition or prosecuting cyberfelons and unlawful intrusive 
government agents, violators could be turned over to appropriate law enforcement 
agencies by the international body for vio lating international cyber regulations as well as 
country specific violations. There would be no differentiation between unlawful acts 
committed by a Netizen and unlawful acts committed by a government agent. There 
would be no requirement to extradite, but a country could request extradition i f  it wished. 
In addition, each country could include its accounts o f crimes committed against that 
country by that individual or the government agency. The international agency would 
enumerate all offenses and provide a detailed list o f all violations a suspect user 
committed. .After being tried by a judicial committee for all crimes, the international
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agency w ill issue a punishment for those offenses the crim inal was found guilty o f 
committing. Perhaps this may seem like a naïve vision; however, the multistate- 
delegated power would establish the agency’s global power in regulating and 
adjudicating Internet crimes. This agency could be the next step past a body like the 
United Nations, and could bring about whole new generation o f effective international 
regulating bodies that supersede nation-state rules.
Conclusion
The Internet is a confusing and complicated world hidden beneath interactive 
commercial ads and "net”  lingo. Unmanageable for the providers and seemingly 
unregulated, this virtual W ild West is slowly being tamed through governments’ 
interventions. Yet, as government attempts to civilize this savage realm, it encroaches 
upon the privacy freedoms enjoyed by Netizens. American Netizens need to take a stand 
against government sanctioned intrusions committed against their privacy. United States 
courts have stated that there is a constitutional right to privacy fo r the communications 
and interactions in which Netizens partake. However, members o f Congress are afraid to 
defend the right to privacy as a result o f fears elicited from recent acts o f violence.
The USA PATRIOT ACT is a disservice to the previous expanding cyber-privacy 
protections. This act needs to be reexamined by the Congress and the Supreme Court to 
either amend or repeal it. Its sanctions against criminal behavior cripple the electronic 
privacy rights that have just recently begun to make sense, and yet the act fails to apply
*' This jud ic ia l panel might be compromised o f the United Nations High Court, or it may 
entail jud ic ia l figures, chosen by each country governed by the cyber agency, which 
rotate every so many years.
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strictly to terrorism, as some would purport it does. As a result o f national agencies' 
overreactions to foreign and domestic violence, there is a need to create an unbiased 
international agency to protect the right o f privacy that many western countries around 
the world profess to uphold. W ithout a regulating agency, there w ill be no body to 
sanction the mansgressions that governments' law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
commit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX I
PRIVACY AMENDMENTS IN THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION
Amendment I
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment o f religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or o f the press; or the right o f 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress o f
In privacy rights, this Amendment is commonly used to refer to the aspect o f freedom o f 
speech and the freedom o f association.
Amendment 111
"N o soldier shall, in time o f peace be quartered in any house, without the consent o f the 
Owner, nor in time of war. but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”
This amendment has been used in conjunction with the 4'*’ Amendment to argue the rights 
o f a citizen over that o f the state, when it involves actions committed in one’s own home.
Amendment IV
"The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The 4'*’ Amendment has been used to define the rights o f citizens and the areas o f 
protection for tangible and nontangible items. Some protected privacy zones are 
conversations, the right to read or view pornographic material, prophylactic rights 
between two consenting adults o f different sexes, rights to contraception, the right to 
beget a child, and the termination o f pregnancy.
Amendment V
"N o person shall be held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
presentment or indictment o f a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the M ilitia , when in actual service in time o f War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy o f life or limb; nor
66
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shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived o f 
life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use. w ithout just compensation.”
The 5'*' Amendment has been used to protect conversations and correspondence between 
two people as well as documents from a person, which would implicate him/her in a court 
o f law.
Amendment IX
"The enumeration in the Constitution, o f certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”
Often called the "catch all”  amendment, the 9'*’ Amendment has been used in conjunction 
with other amendments to protect privacy rights not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution.
Amendment X IV . section 1
"A ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens o f the United States and o f the state wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities o f citizens 
o f the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property, 
without due process o f law; nor deny to any person w ith in its jurisdiction the equal 
protection o f the laws.”
The 14'*’ Amendment protects the right o f due process for each citizen o f the United 
States. This amendment has been used in the privacy realm o f reproductive or 
contraceptive rights. In addition, it has been used in other arguments such the right to 
die. However, euthanasia has not yet been able to find a stable and favorable decision in 
the courts in protecting the right to terminate one’s own life.
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Griswold V.  Connecticut. 381 U. S. 479 (1965).
Katz V. United States. 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
Nardone et al. v. United States. 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
Olmstead et al v. United States. 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U. S. 557 (1968).
United States District Court
Timothy R. M cVeigh v. W illiam  S. Cohen, et al.. C ivil Action 98-116. United States 
District Court fo r the District o f Columbia (1998).
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APPENDIX III
RELATED INTERNET WEBSITES
For information on Carnivore, check out the following sites:
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/camivore/camivore2.htm
http://www.msnbc.com/news/477749.asp
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/foia_documents.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/jud_comm.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/kerr_letter.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/army.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/test_6_00.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/projects.html
http://wwv/.epic.org/privacy/camivore/deployments.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/omnivoreproposal.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/dragonnetproposal.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/camivorenotes.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/camivorequestions.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/evolution.himl
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/phipletroenix.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/purpose.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/review 1 .html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/test 1 .html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore.html
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